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l og os  20 :2  spr i ng 2017
Daniel P. Maher
Human Action
in Philosophy and Poetry
The philosophical effort to see and say the truth about human 
agents and human action seems very different from the poetic effort 
to delight us with actors who only pretend to do what we see them 
do. These two modes of thinking present action differently, and I ap-
proach this difference through pedagogical considerations associated 
with teaching ethics in philosophy classes. Students rightly sense a 
difference between the philosophical appreciation of human beings 
as practical and the character of real human action as acted. In this 
paper, I argue that part of this distance can be bridged by considering 
the poetic imitation of action. Obviously, the imitation of action is 
artificial and therefore also stands at some distance from real action 
as acted. Nevertheless, I argue, philosophical reflection can benefit 
from the support of poetic display. My claim is not merely pedagogi-
cal, but philosophical: poetic imitation and presentation of action 
brings human action to full intelligibility, which would otherwise 
remain dormant.
In the first part of this article, I make some general remarks about 
the metaphysical warrant for supplementing philosophical ethics with 
artistic presentation of action, that is to say, poiêsis in the Aristotelian 
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sense. By drawing on some familiar Aristotelian distinctions, I show 
how literary depictions of action can carry philosophical weight. In 
the second, I consider, as one instance of philosophically insightful, 
poetic treatment of action, a short story by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn 
entitled “The New Generation.”
I.
There are no trolley cars in my ethics class. There are no lifeboats 
or desert islands where we face arresting dilemmas. These fashion-
able thought experiments eliminate all the ephemeral accidents of 
ordinary reality and place anyone and everyone at the heart of a 
constructed situation calling urgently for decision. They can be cap-
tivating because they feel like a puzzle or a riddle, and this helps 
overcome the natural tendency to evade serious thinking about how 
we choose. Such problems crystallize and make plain the logic we 
embrace in making one decision rather than another, and they help 
us examine how we necessarily endorse principles embedded in our 
actions. Still, there are no trolley cars in my ethics class. Instead, 
there are stories.
I have two things to say in defense of this practice. The first re-
quires a little metaphysics, for which I appropriate and adapt a thesis 
recently expressed by Robert Sokolowski: “Each accidental predica-
tion specifies a property.”1 For example, saying “The window is bro-
ken” insinuates a property—frangibility or something similar—that 
belongs to windows. Mentioning the one determination (broken) 
invokes a property lying dormant in any window, which might be 
actualized variously, as in a window that is cracked or shattered or 
creaking. Accidents reveal properties and properties, in turn, specify 
essences. So a transient accidental feature, like a smile, is one of many 
possible manifestations of a property, traditionally called risibility, 
which is found in all human beings and only human beings and which 
is therefore revelatory of the human essence.2 Risibility is a power or 
potency that might be actualized in a knowing grin, a childish giggle, 
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or a mocking laugh, as well as countless variants. The accident, which 
does not have to be there and is hardly a real being at all, signifies the 
property, which reveals one aspect of an essence. To mention a smile 
is to appeal implicitly to human nature. The Cheshire Cat, with its 
grin inhering in nothing, makes this point by way of nonsense.
Accidents, like smiles, mediate otherwise hidden natures. Even 
risibility is inaccessible to us; we know it only through its several 
 actualizations—this polite chuckle, that impish grin, and so on. 
What is first for us is not first in itself, and no matter what progress 
we make toward understanding essences, we can never replace or 
dispense with our starting point, namely, the superficial and evanes-
cent accidents. And the accident is intelligible only as a temporary 
and non-necessary determination of what is permanent “beneath” 
it, namely, the property immediately and the essence ultimately. In 
Aristotle’s language, accidents imply properties and essence as their 
matter, like snub implies nose and nose implies animal.3
Sokolowski shows how this metaphysical structure enables a good 
artist to evoke and intimate the human essence with the display of a 
simple accident. Even when the accident is instantaneous and almost 
without context, it has this power: Mona Lisa’s smile or Churchill’s 
scowl in Yousuf Karsh’s iconic portrait. By depicting a smile, a sigh, a 
promise, a hesitation, a blink, and other singular incidents in circum-
stances where someone or some particular character might act that 
way, the poet manifests the properties attached to human nature. 
The surface manifestations are simple and obvious, but the potencies 
underlying them are obscure. It is often difficult to name these prop-
erties, but the principle is undeniable: human beings are such that 
they can do these things; these acts are the blossoms of the interior 
nature. Accidents hint, and poets use accidents to suggest what lies 
within. When a character in a story makes a promise, we have before 
us human nature in one of its essential possibilities. What are we that 
we can and do make promises? While in the determinate present, we 
declare what the uncertain future shall hold or, at least, what it shall 
receive from us. In acting this way, what do we take ourselves to be, 
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such that we think we can bind ourselves today to act in specific ways 
tomorrow? And what do we do when it proves difficult to be a being 
that makes promises or when the promise we make conflicts with the 
nature we have?
The poet, rather than addressing these questions analytically or 
systematically, raises them by constructing a world where the hu-
man essence and its properties are on display in and through specific 
determinations. We see a promise made, and the ensuing action il-
luminates our nature. We do not get the whole of the property in 
question, but the whole property is there in potency because one 
particular actualization is on display. The dog that does not bark 
has its meaning from what it means to be a dog. The promise that 
is made and the action that unfolds belong to a human being, for 
whom  action has an end, by nature, independent of particular choic-
es. Aristotle says, “All human happiness or misery takes the form of 
action; the end for which we live is a certain kind of activity, not a 
quality. Character gives us qualities, but it is in our actions—what 
we do—that we are happy or the reverse.”4 The accidents illustrate 
our nature, not simply for structural display, but against the back-
drop of the end of human action. Whatever may be lost in universal-
ity or comprehensiveness is, in the hands of the skillful artist, more 
than compensated for by the definiteness of actuality. This claim pre-
supposes that the poet’s grasp of the relevant subject matter is not 
confused or distorted. Because it often is distorted, however, there 
has arisen “an old quarrel between philosophy and poetry” (Republic 
607b). The quarrel is not with poetry as such but with the limited or 
mistaken understanding a poet might possess, as Plato’s own writ-
ing demonstrates.5 In good poetic hands, the actions we see intimate 
natures we do not. This character smiles rather than laughs, or one 
character laughs when no one else does. Two characters in situations 
that are the same or similar act differently, or the same character 
acts now in one way and now in another, and yet a single property 
or character trait might be shown to be the principle of both ac-
tions. Not every accident that might be mentioned can be, and so 
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the selection of accidents is not accidental but integral to the story. 
The blush of Thrasymachus belongs to the argument of Plato’s Repub-
lic. Furthermore, one human property is the capacity to change and 
thereby reform or deform oneself. Nevertheless, we cannot see the 
degree to which we can and cannot change our spots—and whether 
doing so is loss or gain— except through examining particular cases 
where people do or do not become other. A good poet chooses one 
manifestation of a property in preference to others in the artfully 
constructed situation, thereby conveying not only character, but a 
determinate and fixed appearance of human nature syntactically con-
nected to the other elements in the narrative whole, with happiness 
and misery on the table.
Obviously, this does not amount to a complete literary theory. I 
have described a philosophical use of literature or a way to read at least 
some literature with philosophical concerns in mind. Some works 
permit this type of reading, and yet that does not mean literature is 
reduced to philosophy by other means. Some poets portray moral 
distinctions with great precision, and these can be philosophically 
illuminating, even if the poet pursues other things  simultaneously.
I turn now to the second point in defense of stories in teach-
ing ethics. The well-crafted story presents human action in the mode 
that most permits its intelligibility to appear. Ethics is concerned 
with real actions and real choices, but real human action has lim-
ited intelligibility. Its inescapable particularity precludes the uni-
versality needed for understanding, and its diffusion into accidental 
circumstances inhibits our efforts to identify independent wholes. 
Nevertheless, human intelligence finds at least three ways to deal 
with action. One dimension of intelligibility is achieved or appreci-
ated by those with practical wisdom and missed by, for example, the 
incontinent and the  vicious. This is practical intelligence engaged in 
making choices, where particular circumstances require great atten-
tion. Another form of the intelligibility of action is the philosophical 
sort achieved by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics and missed by those 
who do not see, for example, how ends structure choices and how 
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moral  characters provide some determinacy to those choices. In this 
case, the near-constancy of character predominates over and gives 
intelligibility to particular choices, and one seeks to understand, say, 
the nature of friendship rather than to make friends. A third form of 
intelligibility arises only through poetry, which both exploits par-
ticularity and overcomes the inherently disjointed, episodic, and in-
definite character of our actions.6
In real life, a single, deliberate action intersects with countless 
other lines of causality in essentially meaningless ways. While grading 
papers in my office, I am also drawing on the power grid, providing 
a market for office-supply companies and a burden for the trash col-
lector, serving as a distraction for my colleague who drops by to chat, 
and so on. Again, the action of grading, as a human transaction with 
my students, is also a step in a process with indefinitely many begin-
ning points: when I first began teaching or when I was hired at this job 
or when these students enrolled in my class or when their several ed-
ucations first began. Moreover, despite the fact that my grading is very 
likely never to cause a ripple in the fabric of the universe—it might. 
It could have any number of effects on a particular student, and at no 
point can that action be said certainly to be finished. Real action has 
no clear beginning or end, in the sense that no first moment stands 
isolated from what came before and no last stage terminates all con-
sequences, after which there is nothing. Real action is coterminous or 
coincident with indefinitely many prior, posterior, and simultaneous 
matters, to which it is nevertheless completely unrelated, except by 
happenstance. Most important, the anticipations of the future begun 
in the past and at work in the present, both in natural motions and 
deliberate choices, give way to a future that is not fixed; the lines 
of causality are subject to  interference— unintelligible chance—such 
that some of what will come to be tomorrow is not genuinely in the 
process of coming to be today.
The poetic presentation of action brings action to intelligibility 
by isolating and connecting. Everything unrelated, improbable, and 
irrational is left out, and connections are established between what, 
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in real action, would be accidental or unintelligible.7 Nothing merely 
happens “next” without happening because of what came before and 
for the sake of what comes after. Plot is the artificial form, analogous 
to substantial form, introduced by the poet into an indefinite sub-
ject matter, and the result is a likeness or imitation of real action, 
superior in its intelligibility precisely because it reproduces the inci-
dental and eliminates it at the same time.8 Aristotle’s Ethics focuses 
on character, and his Poetics focuses on action because only poetry 
fits action for contemplation. Real human action in its virtually infi-
nite variety is too indefinite for comprehension. Character provides 
the unity and stability in an individual’s many actions necessary for 
Aristotle’s consideration of the good life in his Ethics, but we should 
not demand more precision than that subject matter permits and 
should recognize that a single life is not sufficiently unified for one 
story.9 “Tragedy is an imitation of an action that is complete in itself ” 
(7.1450b24–25). The imitation begins at a point artificially without 
antecedent, and it ends at a point artificially without consequence. 
Plot unites the sequential events, and the resultant whole approxi-
mates organic necessity, “with its several incidents so closely con-
nected that the transposition or withdrawal of any one of them will 
disjoin and dislocate the whole. For that which makes no perceptible 
difference by its presence or absence is no real part of the whole” 
(8.1451a32–35).
“Poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than 
history” (9.1451b5–6) because it evokes the universal; poetry’s ac-
cidents are not merely accidents, and in fact they are not accidents 
at all; they are intelligibly necessary to the imitation. History, in the 
sense of the things that have happened, untouched even by a his-
torian’s art of selection, is stupid, and bad historians are ignorant 
of their own principles of selection.10 The excellent poet imitates 
action by artificially isolating and connecting what really cannot be 
isolated and definitely connected. Countless elements that would be 
necessary in real life are simply ignored and denied, like whatever 
lies beyond the frame of a portrait. And the artificial form sinks into 
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the events on display and is not seen directly, much as the soul oper-
ates invisibly in a living being. Plot transforms the elements of the 
story while remaining itself transparent, and in this way we become 
convinced that the imitation is action. Verisimilitude is needed for 
plausibility, but this is a subordinate concern, and deliberate falsifica-
tions can enhance the work (Poetics chap. 25), provided they aid in 
rendering action fit for contemplation.
The most controversial thesis I want to entertain here is endorsed 
by Thomas Prufer. He claims that real action is better understood by 
means of its imitation, despite the artificiality and occasional falsity 
of that imitation. We do not exactly look away from real action when 
we look at its imitation. Prufer’s thesis: “The original is enriched, not 
distorted, by its image. The imitated action is heightened and sharp-
ened by the imitation into being more truly itself than it would be 
if it were not imitated and thus made available for contemplation in 
and through the transforming imitation.”11 This suggests that poetic 
form—that is, the plot of a story of, say, betrayal—is set within the 
accidents and incidents and characters that serve as matter for this 
form, and, by means of discerning that plot, we understand real acts 
of betrayal better. It is almost as if the poetic form takes the place of 
the Platonic form, and the particular act of betrayal exists by way of 
participation in the pure form constructed by the poet. That form 
is what our action would be if not depleted, eroded, and blurred at 
the edges by circumstances. The poet removes any reality that would 
create friction and blunt the edges of the form he wishes to present.
Poetic plot makes action intelligible, without necessarily being 
morally didactic or edifying. Aristotle says there is not the same kind 
of correctness in poetry as in politics (25.1460b13–14). Politics 
aims to instill virtue, and the best poetry does not have that standard 
for correctness. Poetry may falsify in various ways that are compat-
ible with fitting action for contemplation; it need not aim at moral 
improvement. Similarly, the end of classroom instruction cannot be 
the inculcation of virtue. Teaching can help students think, but teach-
ing cannot make them good. At least, it cannot aim to do so.
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II.
Not all dramatic works can be expected to articulate moral phenom-
ena with the same clarity. Solzhenitsyn’s sensitivity to moral distinc-
tions lends his characters and their actions a moral precision other 
authors might not convey. Because there is no reality to characters 
and their actions other than what the author puts in the story, we can 
comprehend them in their actions better than we can comprehend 
real moral agents and their actions.12 Excellent fictional characters 
display realism and complexity and avoid being flat or cartoonish. 
The poet includes in some fashion everything necessary for under-
standing their action, and whatever is not conveyed is unnecessary. 
Real agents and real choices (even our own) never reduce to full in-
telligibility. Their origins, their consequences, and their significance 
always elude our understanding to some degree or other. A good 
poetic whole is not episodic; there is a beginning, which has nothing 
necessary before it, and an end, which follows naturally after what 
precedes without being followed by anything else (7.1450b26–34). 
Solzhenitsyn is famous for writing on an epic scale, but he also writes 
stories of smaller proportion.
Below, I first summarize the action of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s 
“The New Generation,” with special attention to how the accidents 
display essential properties, and second, I illustrate some of the ways 
this text can help us think philosophically about action. 
“The New Generation” has a literary form Solzhenitsyn called the 
binary tale.13 Each story has two parts, and the form admits great 
variety in how the two relate to one another. In the two parts of this 
story, we see the same two characters interacting in vastly different 
circumstances: first in 1926, where Vozdvizhensky is an engineer-
ing professor administering an exam to students, one of whom is 
Konoplyov, and then in late 1930 or 1931 when Vozdvizhensky has 
landed in prison on wholly specious charges of sabotaging the revo-
lution, and his interrogator turns out to be Konoplyov. This might 
seem like a clumsy reversal, lacking in subtlety, where the wheel 
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of fortune turns and the questioner becomes the questioned.14 That 
is superficial, for the essential action of the story is not reversal but 
recognition. Vozdvizhensky is on trial each time, and only at the end 
does he see himself as he is. “The New Generation” is a tragedy after 
Aristotle’s taste.
The story opens with Vozdvizhensky’s administering a civil en-
gineering exam on strength of materials. One student, Konoplyov, 
displays that distress immediately recognizable to every teacher and 
every student. Gradually, others complete the exam, and Konoplyov 
is the only student remaining. Vozdvizhensky speaks to him “firmly 
but not crossly.” Konoplyov knows nothing of what he should know, 
and he does not pretend. His efforts have been sincere, but, as he 
puts it, “I’m out of place here.” He is a tinsmith, moved to engineer-
ing school in preference to those who come from nonproletarian 
origins, in keeping with Soviet education policy. Seeing the effec-
tively blank exam, Vozdvizhensky sympathizes and twice reaches for 
moral principle in the form of saying, “There’s nothing I can do.” 
Nevertheless, he recalls that the administration has given “unambigu-
ous instructions to make allowances” for such students. And then 
Vozdvizhensky thinks the thought that, in one form or another, has 
entered the head not only of every teacher, but of everyone who has 
served any organization: “If the authorities have such a strict policy 
and are fully aware of the absurdities it creates, then why should I 
care more than they do?” (61). This passing thought evokes (among 
others) the property of institutions enabling them to adopt purposes 
that are incompatible with their ends and thereby to squeeze con-
scientious subordinates between their responsibility to pursue those 
ends and their obligation to obey instructions. As he has this dead-
ly thought, he proceeds to give Konoplyov a fig-leaf lecture about 
study habits, patently irrelevant because both know effort is not the 
problem, and he passes Konoplyov, who jubilantly announces, “I’ll 
never forget this” (62). An exhortation to virtue may be appropriate 
even when one strongly suspects it will be ignored, but exhorting 
someone you know cannot do what you urge bespeaks a different 
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kind of failure, and the relevant vice is in the speaker. Vozdvizhensky 
pretends to be serious about his responsibilities as he betrays them. 
More precisely and more damningly, he pretends to himself.
In the remainder of the first part of the story, we see Vozdvizhen-
sky go home to his family, and we see Konoplyov attend a politi-
cal rally for young people. As the professor makes his way home on 
the train, Solzhenitsyn uses the clothing of the passengers to tell the 
story of political transformation. Vozdvizhensky “dressed in a modest 
and well-worn suit but still kept his white collar and tie.” Other pro-
fessors are more “in keeping with the spirit of the times.” We meet 
Lyolka, the professor’s daughter, about fourteen, busy welcoming 
her father home. “Their square oak table was already set and had a 
sprig of lilac at its center.” The sparseness of such details empowers 
this one to set a whole scene. Lyolka is interested in engineering 
school, but she is likely to be excluded for the same reason Kono-
plyov has been admitted. Moreover, she will not be one of those 
students recommended on the basis of “political reliability” (62). Her 
hair is unfashionably long. Her father seems to admire her and fear 
for her because she speaks her mind “so precisely and simply” (63).
While still troubled about Konoplyov, Vozdvizhensky urges his 
daughter to join the Communist Union of Youth or “Komsomol” be-
cause “you simply can’t avoid swimming along in this stream.” He says 
and genuinely believes, “This new generation of young people re-
ally does have something, some truth that we can’t fully understand. 
They certainly must have something.” He does not speak as a father 
who knows best. He has no judgment of his own, and he urges her to 
conform as well. For her part, not even to serve her academic aspira-
tions will she join. We do not know her reasons, but she is emphatic: 
“I don’t want to. . . . The Komsomol is disgusting.” In response, her 
father “sighed once more” (64). The sigh is a momentary expression 
of resignation, an acceptance of failure. When did he sigh before? 
At the end of his exchange with Konoplyov, he gave the self-serving 
lecture, and then, “He heaved a deep sigh. Slowly and deliberately, 
he wrote in ‘pass’ ” (61). Solzhenitsyn connects the fecklessness of 
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the professor with respect to the student and the father with respect 
to the daughter. In different ways we see Vozdvizhensky unable to 
sustain a thought or to judge for himself. He acquiesces to vague 
forces he explicitly admits he does not understand: “They certainly 
must have something.” Vozdvizhensky is decent, but that is all, and he 
trusts his decency, though he should not.
At the Lenin Regional Soviet House of Culture, Konoplyov attends 
a rally involving both Komsomol members like himself and younger 
nonmembers. Konoplyov senses he belongs among this crowd of six 
hundred. He feels power, but not personally. He feels it in the ano-
nymity of the group and their swell of emotion: “There was some-
thing in this grand ceremony of coming together that just seemed to 
draw you in. . . . It hit you like some great battle cry, like making a 
solemn promise under oath” (65). This parallels Vozdvizhensky’s hol-
low admiration for the new generation. Konoplyov identifies vaguely 
with and feels swept up in the “something” Vozdvizhensky sees un-
comprehendingly only from the outside. At the same time, the com-
fortable manner in which Konoplyov fits in with this group contrasts 
with two other instances where the human potential for belonging to 
a group is at issue. First, when personal knowledge is at stake in the 
classroom, Konoplyov cannot “fit in.” His desperate helplessness iso-
lates him, but nothing prevents him from dreamy absorption in the 
new generation. Second, Vozdvizhensky feels a different estrange-
ment from the school due to the administrative policy at odds with 
his responsibility. He fits in by denying the legitimacy of his station 
as a professor. His uneasy conscience shows ambivalence toward this 
action and thus some remaining independent judgment. At the rally, 
Konoplyov endorses what he hears, but he is a follower, not a leader. 
“One comment hit home for Konoplyov: ‘It’s easy to say, “Achieve a 
whole decade of development in two years,” but working at that pace 
might well kill you’” (68). Konoplyov, then, is no ideological fanatic; 
he preserves a sense of self-interest even as he carries out his duties 
within the Party.15
The second half of the story, then, begins approximately five years 
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later. In the intervening years, engineers in particular have been tar-
geted for “wrecking” or sabotaging the interests of the people, who 
are inflamed with immoderate cries for their enemies to be “crushed” 
or “wiped from the face of the earth” (68). Vozdvizhensky feels “help-
less” and unable to express his fears, except in confidence with his 
friend, Friedrich Werner, about whom we know nothing else. And 
then Vozdvizhensky finds himself arrested and held with others, who 
are interrogated, beaten, tortured, and otherwise mistreated. No 
one touches or even questions Vozdvizhensky until he has lost count 
of how many days he has been imprisoned. When finally asked about 
his role in sabotage, he denies it categorically, and in his innocence 
he can only think, “How can an engineer spoil anything?” This simple 
thought reveals one aspect of his extensive lack of self-knowledge. 
He does not recall having betrayed his professional responsibility by 
passing Konoplyov. Furthermore, he takes for granted that engineer-
ing knowledge is used for good and that the good is clear to all.
Soon his interrogator says, “I know very well that you weren’t 
involved in wrecking. But even you have to understand that from here 
no one leaves with an acquittal. It’s either a bullet in the back of the 
neck or a term in the camps” (71). Konoplyov speaks this threat in 
a kindly voice, and then Vozdvizhensky recognizes him. The Komso-
mol, we learn, pulled Konoplyov out of the engineering institute, 
and he has been an interrogator for three years. Because there is 
nothing to confess to, Vozdvizhensky is given the opportunity to 
make up an accusation against someone else. He will not do that. 
Several more interviews follow. Konoplyov treats him decently and 
allows him some privileges, all the while trying to persuade him. 
Vozdvizhensky clings to moral principle: “How could he dishonor 
himself, his very soul?” And then, using words that blend him into 
the Party, Konoplyov reveals his plan or, rather, our plan: “There’s 
a way you can be let out; just sign a promise to supply us with the 
information we need.” Vozdvizhensky has no idea what he could offer 
them. And Konoplyov explains, “About some of your acquaintances, 
Friedrich Werner, for instance. And there’s others on the list.” There 
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is a list. Admirably, Vozdvizhensky declares, “That I can never do!” Ko-
noplyov plays his final card. “So—is it the camps? Just keep in mind: 
your daughter will also get kicked out of her last year as a class alien. 
And maybe your possessions and your apartment will be confiscated. 
I’m doing you a big favor.” Vozdvizhensky drops his head and sobs, as 
he realizes finally the kind of man he is. The betrayal is terrible, but 
the tragedy occurs in the recognition of collapse inside the professor. 
Solzhenitsyn has the delicacy not to name this or describe it; he lets it 
appear in the silence preceding the sobs. Only one sentence remains 
in the story: “A week later he was set free” (73).
There is no violence, and yet this is brutal. As Aristotle prefers, 
the violence is kept off stage and presented through the action rather 
than by means of spectacle (14.1453b4–6). The brutality here—the 
soul-crushing use of Vozdvizhensky’s love for his daughter to impli-
cate him in political oppression—would be obscured had it involved 
physical violence. Konoplyov never touches the man because he 
knows he does not have to. When Konoplyov proved unable to write 
anything on the exam, Vozdvizhensky took it upon himself to solve 
the problem at the price of his own integrity. Konoplyov knows his 
strength of materials after all, and, as he promised, he did not forget 
what Vozdvizhensky did for him. This must have been Konoplyov’s 
interrogation plan all along, not something improvised along the 
way. Having an engineer who informs is an asset, a much greater vic-
tory than a phony confession or accusation. They own Vozdvizhensky 
now and can do what they want with this broken man. He notices 
his disintegration only in its final moment, and we see this as the 
completion of what has been underway in him for some time.
In the second part of the second part of this article, I draw at-
tention to aspects of this story that make it particularly useful in 
the classroom. One feature depends upon the narrator’s voice. The 
narrator is somewhat impersonal, but closely identified with Vozd-
vizhensky’s thinking. The narrator states things that are unknown to 
Vozdvizhensky, but we are usually looking at the events as they appear 
to him. Sometimes we even hear Vozdvizhensky’s thoughts (61), but 
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we also hear Konoplyov’s thoughts on occasion (66). In each case, the 
narrator’s voice blends with that of the character. We are thus identi-
fied with each character, or at least we are asked to utter the thinking 
that belongs to each character in turn, as if these were our thoughts. 
That possibility—thinking the thoughts that belong to another— 
belies the notion of moral viewpoint as simply private, individual, ir-
revocably unique, and tied to personal convictions. We are invited to 
think from multiple points of view, and we find ourselves quite able 
to do so. This kind of thinking is essential to moral philosophy in the 
classroom. We ask students to read Kant and Aristotle and  others, 
and the point is that they learn to appraise human actions as Kant 
and Aristotle do. Such authors typically see more perceptively than 
most, and trying on their thinking expands our capacities. Students 
often see no point in taking the trouble. Why exert oneself when 
one already has a point of view without effort?  They know already, 
of course, about the multiplicity of perspectives, and, convinced as 
they are that no particular perspective is better than any other, they 
are committed to their own as most comfortable. Literary characters 
help to break this learned obstacle to thinking. Literary characters, 
when properly drawn, help one see the limitations of a point of view 
and how those limitations might be overcome.
The particulars of the action in the story help raise further issues. 
First, the story displays evil in the form of malice and in the form 
of weakness. The widespread tendency to think that all people mean 
well or that weakness is not really evil is challenged in the story. Stu-
dents reach for this explanation, but the story precludes it.
Second, in the opening scene a student struggles with an exam, 
and students immediately embrace the story. They want Konoplyov 
to be given a break, and yet they will come to admit that it is bad to 
pass a student who deserves to fail. No one wants to cross a bridge 
built by Konoplyov; passing him signifies not kindness but injustice 
and corruption. This can be established on the basis of the text with-
out ambiguity, unlike real action, where our capacity to judge is 
more limited. 
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Third, students tend not to see the way in which Vozdvizhensky 
compromises himself in the first scene until they have seen it in light 
of the end of the story. And then they understand the beginning bet-
ter. In a story, the meaning of one action can be defined in relation 
to another; in real action, we cannot have the same unity between 
what comes before and what comes after. These deeds illuminate one 
another in a way that they could not in real life because the same 
two actions would be related also to an infinite number of other 
actions, which cast light in different directions and with different ef-
fects. Within a story, the range of possible meanings is narrowed. On 
the substance of the issue, Solzhenitsyn helps us see Vozdvizhensky’s 
dereliction of duty passed off as compassion. The moment where 
Vozdvizhensky asks whether he will do what he knows to be right or 
follow the path of least resistance is a moment everyone faces more 
than once. At first, students might see only kindness in Vozdvizhen-
sky’s treatment of Konoplyov. Less defensibly, some might think that 
Konoplyov has returned the favor by letting Vozdvizhensky go free 
at the end. That reading does not withstand a moment’s scrutiny. 
No one does you a favor by threatening your family so that you will 
betray your friend. Likewise, it is not kindness to pretend someone 
is competent in a profession on which people depend. Students want 
something simple here that is easy to think about, but the story cuts 
one off from those readings.
Fourth, most students tend immediately to exonerate Vozdvi-
zhensky because they see him as a victim. He is to be pitied, cer-
tainly, and one must acknowledge that even a much stronger person 
might collapse under such inhuman cruelty. Nevertheless, students 
do not reason to this conclusion; they simply grab clichés that sub-
stitute for thinking about the story. They tend to say Vozdvizhensky 
“had no choice.” They try to argue that he exercises no moral agency 
at all and, consequently, that he must choose family over his friend. 
The contradiction here—they say he has no choice and praise him 
for choosing rightly—provides occasion for pointing out the differ-
ence between force, which removes moral agency (like prison move-
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ments) and threats, which leave it intact while pressing it to operate 
in one way rather than another. Drawing this distinction helps to 
show how all moral agency occurs in a context of desires and fears 
and pressures of various kinds. There is no context-free choice, but 
the attempt to push one’s decisions off onto one’s upbringing or so-
ciety or the company or anything other than one’s poor self is the 
original human evasion. This text does not permit students to ig-
nore that Vozdvizhensky chooses to do what he does. Vozdvizhensky 
himself does not think that he has done the right thing, nor does he 
pretend he has not acted. In real action, it would be impossible to 
preclude that something other than a moral choice occurred.
Finally, Solzhenitsyn presents a subtle reflection on the relation 
between family and the moral good. Students think of their families 
as being the source of their moral understanding and see no need 
to question what family attachments mean. Without presuming to 
do more than scratch the surface of this topic, I note that students 
at least claim to see no problem with abandoning a friend in order 
to protect family. At first, they do not anticipate that Konoplyov is 
equally capable of asking Vozdvizhensky to inform on his daughter in 
order to protect his son (or on either to protect himself). They come 
to see that if there is something or someone you will do anything to 
protect, an unscrupulous person can own you.16 Such attachments 
are weaknesses, which is not to say one should not have them, but 
rather that one should think about what those attachments are and 
mean. If students want to defend Vozdvizhensky, Solzhenitsyn’s text 
forces them to say that a family is the sort of thing that leads us to be-
tray our friends and that preserving family justifies betraying friends. 
And once we have seen that, we can raise the question of why then 
the family deserves to be preserved. The human potency for attach-
ment to family suddenly does not seem to be unqualifiedly good.17
That theme is somewhat muted in this story, but it appears 
prominently in the final sentence of the first part. During the politi-
cal rally, a young person about the age of Vozdvizhensky’s daughter 
asks a question about the Young Pioneers, which is the organization 
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for those too young for the Komsomol: “And who should listen to 
whom: a good pioneer to a bad father, or a bad father to a good pio-
neer?” The question insinuates that political affiliation is the standard 
of moral goodness and defines a bad father as one who opposes a 
good pioneer. In other words, when should our moral integrity lead 
us to abandon our family attachments?  In real life, this question leads 
in a thousand directions, but in the story, it points to the only person 
identified as a father: Vozdvizhensky. To be sure, his daughter does 
not take her moral standards from the Party. Nonetheless, she asserts 
her moral integrity against her father’s counsel; should he listen to 
his daughter, or should his daughter listen to him? What is the rela-
tion between virtue and family? Once it has become clear to students 
that family—or what one has learned from one’s family—is not nec-
essarily good, they recognize the need to think for themselves. And 
this is, in fact, the best one can aim to achieve in the classroom.
Solzhenitsyn does not tell us how to think about these questions, 
but his story puts them before us in a definite form through which 
we can begin thinking about philosophical understandings of, for 
 example, virtue. I do not claim that this is the only way to under-
stand literary form or that all stories serve this role equally well, but 
some do. Nor do I claim that poetry is essentially instrumental to 
philosophy, but only that philosophical inquiry can draw substantive-
ly from literary works. Their philosophical importance is not merely 
rhetorical or protreptic. The poetic appeal to the imagination makes 
it easier to interest people in philosophical questions, but that is not 
all. We see the significance of chosen actions better in dramatic dis-
play than in philosophical reflection. Philosophical thinking finds in 
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